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Beyond Illusions
On the Limitations of Perceiving Relational Properties
Heiko Hecht
Explaining the perception of our visual world is a hard problem because the visual
system has to fill the gap between the information available to the eye and the
much richer visual world that is derived from the former. Perceptual illusions con-
tinue to fascinate many researchers because they seem to promise a glimpse of
how the visual system fills this gap. Illusions are often interpreted as evidence of
the error-prone nature of the process. Here I will show that the opposite is true.
To do so, I introduce a novel stance on what constitutes an illusion, arguing that
the traditional view (illusion as mere discrepancy between stimulus and percept)
has to be replaced by illusion as a manifest noticed discrepancy. The two views,
unfortunately,  are not necessarily related. On the contrary; we experience the
most spectacular illusions where our perception is pretty much on target. Once
our interpretation of the sensory data is off the mark, we usually no longer experi-
ence illusions but live happily without ever noticing the enormous perceptual and
conceptual errors we make. The farther we move away from simple pictorial stim-
uli  as  the subject  of  our investigations,  the more commonplace a discrepancy
between percept and reality does become—and the less likely we are willing to
call it illusory. Two case studies of our perception of relational properties will
serve to illustrate this idea. The case studies are based on the conviction that
perceiving is more than mere sensation, and that some degree of (unconscious)
judgment is a necessary ingredient of perception. We understand little about how
to balance objects and we make fundamental mistakes when perceiving the slip-
periness of surfaces. All the while, we never experience illusions in this context.
Thus, when dealing with simple percepts, illusions may be revealing. But when it
comes to percepts that involve relational properties, illusions fail to arise, as per-
ception is not concerned with veridicality but appears to be satisfied with the first
solution that does not interfere with our daily activities.
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1 Illusion?
1.1 The underspecification problem (UP) 
Visual perception can be seen as the process by
which the visual system interprets the sensory
core data that come in through the retinae of
the eyes (see e.g., Hatfield & Epstein 1979). The
sensory core is not sufficient to specify the per-
cept;  that  is,  there  is  an  explanatory  gap
between the information present at the retina—
which is in essence two-dimensional (2D)—and
the information present in the three-dimensional
(3D) objects that we see. Let us call the prob-
lem that  arises  in  having to fill  this  gap the
“underspecification problem” (see  Hecht 2000).
Figure  1 illustrates the UP (underspecification
problem). A given object can only project one
particular  image  onto  the  projection  surface
(retina); however, a given projection could have
been caused by an indefinite number of objects
in the world. Because of this anisotropy in the
mapping between the 3D object and its 2D pro-
jection, information is lost during the projective
process,  which  cannot  be  regained  with  cer-
tainty. One could argue that the history of per-
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ception theories is more or less the history of
finding solutions to reconstruct the 3D object
that has caused a given projection. 
Figure  1:  Underspecification: The 3D origin of a given
image on the retina (here approximated by the vertical
projection screen) is provided by an indefinite number of
objects at various orientations in space. Illustration from
Gibson (1979).
In order to assess the quality of the solu-
tion offered by a given perceptual theory, we
have  to  evaluate  how  it  describes  the  gap
between  sensory  core  and  percept  and  the
mechanism by which it suggests that the gap
is being bridged. The Gibsonian theory of dir-
ect perception aside—which denies  the prob-
lem altogether (e.g., Gibson 1979)—we have a
variety of  theories  to  choose  from.  They are
all constructionist in the sense that the sens-
ory data have to be interpreted and arranged
into  the  configuration  that  is  most  likely  or
most logical. The theories differ in the mech-
anisms  they make responsible  for  the  recon-
structive process. For instance,  Hermann von
Helmholtz (1894)  supposes  inferences  of  un-
conscious  nature  that  arrive  inductively  or
maybe  abductively  at  a  preferred  solution.
Roger Shepard (1994), on the other hand sup-
poses  a  recurrence  to  phylogenetically-ac-
quired knowledge. He takes the regularities of
the  physical  world  or  of  geometry  to  have
been internalized through the course of evolu-
tion and to be used to disambiguate compet-
ing solutions. An example of such internalized
knowledge is the fact that light usually comes
from above (see Figure 2). A shading gradient
from light (at the top of  an object) to dark
(at its bottom) would thus be compatible with
a convex but not with a concave object.
Figure 2: Solution of the underspecification by drawing
on internalized knowledge that light comes from above.
The sphere in the right panel looks convex because it is
lighter at the top, whereas the same image rotated by
180° (left panel) looks concave. Have we created an illu-
sion by juxtaposing them?
Others have proposed that the system con-
siders  statistical  probabilities  by defaulting to
contextually  appropriate,  high-frequency  re-
sponses  (Reason 1992)  or  by  applying  the
Bayes-theorem  (e.g.,  Knill &  Richards 1996;
Kersten et  al. 2004),  or  predictive  processing
(Clark this collection;  Hohwy this collection)
Here  we  are  not  concerned  with  the  exact
nature of how the construction is accomplished.
Note, however, that all the solutions that have
been proposed  abound with cognitive  ingredi-
ents. The process of constructing a 3D object
from the 2D retinal input is usually thought to
draw on memory and on some sort of inferen-
cing, albeit unconsciously. The next step to ar-
riving  at  meaningful  percepts  on the  basis  of
the 3D object—which is just as essential in per-
ception—involves even more cognitive elements,
be they unconscious or amenable to conscious-
ness.
Here I would like to include a brief aside,
which may seem obvious to the psychologist but
not  so  obvious  to  the  philosopher.  Perceiving
cannot  be  dissected  successfully  into  a  sensa-
tional part and a judgmental part when we are
dealing with the everyday perception of mean-
ingful objects. Perceiving is always judgmental
when we see a stick or a bird, or when it comes
to seeing that we can pick up the stick and that
it falls down when we release it. In other words,
pure sensations may be possible introspectively
—sensing red, sensing heat etc.—but they are
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no  longer  possible  in  everyday  object  percep-
tion, that is a separation of sensation and judg-
ment  is  not  ecologically  valid.  Take,  for  in-
stance, the falling object as given in phenom-
enal perception. In the sub-field of experimental
psychology called “intuitive physics”, investigat-
ors have doctored physical events to contradict
Newtonian physics and presented visual anima-
tions to novice or expert observers. Many of the
latter do not see anything wrong with objects
falling straight down when released, as opposed
to  following  the  proper  parabola  that  they
should (see section  1.3.1 on so-called cognitive
illusions). This perception is reflected in motor
action—people release the object in the wrong
place when trying to hit a container; this per-
ception arises in toddlers unable to reflect upon
the event, and it persists after formal physics
training in cases where observers have to make
quick decisions. Thus, a separation into a sensa-
tion and perceptual judgment is not meaningful
here.  Perception  of  (everyday)  objects  and
events necessarily includes a judgmental aspect,
which may or may not enter consciousness.
Now, we are concerned with the question of
whether the errors that arise during the percep-
tual  process  can  be  used  to  gauge  where  the
visual system fails to capture the 3D world. We
will argue that this is not the case. Research fo-
cusing on so-called optical illusions is particularly
ill-suited to gain insight into how the visual sys-
tem solves the UP. Illusions typically arise when
errors are rather small, thus the presence or mag-
nitude of an illusion is no predictor of the size of
the UP. By and large, perceptual error is rather
small when it comes to simple object properties,
such as size, distance, direction of motion, etc. Er-
rors become much larger, more interesting, and
potentially dangerous when it comes to relational
properties, such as seeing if an object can be lif-
ted or if I will slip and fall when treading on a
given surface. The case studies below will show
that  in  the  context  of  relational  properties  we
make errors but we do not experience illusions. 
1.2 The Luther illusion
Please take a close look at this painting of Mar-
tin Luther. You have certainly seen pictures of
the great protestant reformer before. Does any-
thing about this painting strike you as strange?
Figure  3:  Martin Luther as painted by Lukas Cranach
the Elder (1529), Hessisches Landesmuseum Darmstadt.
You  may  have  found  that  he  looks  well
nourished, as is appropriate for a monk whose en-
joyment of worldly pleasures is well documented.
However, I am sure you did not notice the illu-
sion. Well, I have photoshopped the photograph
and made it 15% wider than it should be. There
is a discrepancy between the painting (or veridical
photograph thereof) and the picture presented in
Figure  3.  Such discrepancies  are  typically  con-
sidered to be the essence of illusion. For instance,
Martinez-Conde & Macknik (2010, p. 4) define an
illusion as “the dissociation between the physical
reality and the subjective perception of an object
or event”. The physical reality of the picture is
distorted by 15%, but your perception was that of
a correct rendition of a famous painting. Now let
us add another twist to the Luther illusion (Fig-
ure 4).
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Figure 4: Martin Luther right side up and upside down.
Have I  taken the original  photograph or
have I turned around the 15% wider version?
Surely, Luther looks to be slimmer in the panel
on the right. If you turn the page upside down,
you will  see that  both panels  show the same
picture that is 15% wider than the original. Let
us assume that the inversion effect—also named
fat-face-thin-illusion  by  Peter  Thompson
(Thompson & Wilson 2012)—is exactly 15 % in
magnitude.  Has the illusion that  I  introduced
initially been nullified by the inversion?
The fictitious Luther illusion is meant to
make  the  point  that  the  mere  discrepancy
between physical reality and a percept should
not be conceived of as illusory. It may not even
be reasonable to conceive of it as an error. The
stretched image may be a better representation
of what we know about Luther than the “cor-
rect” picture. For instance, the picture may typ-
ically be viewed from an inappropriate vantage
point  that  could  make  the  stretched  version
more veridical even when compared to the ac-
tual Luther, were he teleported into our time.
Take Figure  5. I have stretched Luther by an-
other 50%. Now he seems a bit distorted, but
not to an extent that would prevent us from re-
cognizing  him  or  from  enjoying  the  picture.
There is a fundamental property that needs to
be added for something to be considered an illu-
sion. I contend that this is a dual simultaneous
percept that tells us that what we see is so and
not so at the same time (for a detailed defence
of this position see Hecht 2013). For an illusion1
1 Note that I will differentiate between illusiond (being the old notion
of discrepancy between object and percept) and illusionm (the mani-
to be called thus, it has to be manifest immedi-
ately and perceptually. Calling something an il-
lusion is only meaningful if  it refers to a dis-
crepancy that we can see. It is not meaningful if
it refers to some error that we have to infer. 
Figure 5: Martin Luther stretched by another 50%.
Take for instance the often-cited stick in
the  water  that  looks  bent.  The  static  image
presented in Figure 6 is not an illusion. We see
a bent  stick;  note that its  shadow is  bent  as
well, and without recourse to our experience of
refraction that occurs where two media adjoin,
we would not know if  the stick were actually
bent or if some effect of optics had created the
percept.  However,  the  moment  we  move  the
stick up and down we see the illusionm. We see
the stick being bent and being straight at the
same time. The illusion becomes manifest. That
is, the discrepancy if not contradiction between
the two percepts (here the straight and the bent
stick) is  available in our working memory, we
become aware of it, often without being able to
resolve which of the two discrepant percepts is
closer to reality. In the case of the stick, the loc-
ation of the bending at water level reveals that
fest illusion that is perceived rather than inferred with the help of
physics text books). I will only refer to illusionm as illusion, whereas I
will refer to illusiond as mere error or discrepancy. See also the re-
lated distinction between phenomenally opaque and phenomenally
transparent illusions (e.g.,  Metzinger 2003a,  2003b). My distinction
between illusiond and illusionm is meant to be merely perceptual.
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the  stick  is  really  straight;  however,  in  most
cases the illusionm remains unresolved, as for ex-
ample in the case of the Ebbinghaus illusion.
Figure 6: Is the stick bent?
1.3 Thesis: Illusionsm are not evidence of 
error but rather unmasking of error
It would make no sense to call the circles in Fig-
ure 7 an illusionm, even if a researcher could show
with a large dataset that the inner circle is repro-
duced 2% bigger than it was on the picture. How-
ever, as soon as we allow for a direct comparison
and put a ruler to the center circles in Figure 8,
the illusionm arises (see Wundt 1898; an interact-
ive demonstration of the Ebbinghaus illusion can
be  found  at  http://michaelbach.de/ot/cog-
Ebbinghaus/index-de.html).
Illusionsm are perceptually immediate but
they appear to require some form of comparison
and  judgment,  which  supports  the  argument
that phenomenal perception cannot be divided
into a merely sensational core and a cognitive
elaboration.  For  instance,  in  the  case  of  a
Necker  cube  or  a  bi-stable  apparent  motion
quartet, the illusionm can become manifest by a
mere deliberate shift of attention.
Given the severity of the UP, we should not
be fascinated by the existence of error (illusionsd),
but should instead be fascinated by the fact that
our perceptions are pretty much on target most of
the  time.  It  is  truly  amazing  that  among  the
enormous range of possible interpretations of the
retinal  image,  we  usually  pick  the  appropriate
one. Illusionsm are rare special cases of ubiquitous
small  errors  that  become  manifest  because  of
some coincidence or another. Note that this as-
sessment does not only apply to visual perception
but  also  to  other  sensory  modalities  in  which
sensory information has to be interpreted and in-
tegrated. For instance, the cutaneous rabbit illu-
sionm arises when adjacent locations on the skin
of our arm are stimulated in sequence. We experi-
ence one coherent motion (a rabbit moving along
our  arm)  rather  than  a  sequence  of  unrelated
taps. This “inference” can be explained by prob-
abilistic reasoning (Goldreich 2007) and may be
considered the tactile analogue of apparent mo-
tion: just as we cannot perceptually distinguish a
sequence of static stimuli from real motion in the
movie theater. As a matter of fact, the pauses
between the intermittent frames of the movie are
indispensable for motion pictures to look smooth
and continuous. 
Gestalt  psychologists  have  described  the
constructive process by which meaningful ob-
jects emerge from the various elements in our
sensory  core  (see  e.g.,  Max Wertheimer 1912
for  the  case  of  apparent  motion).  For  good
reason,  they  have  avoided  the  term  illusion,
and introduced the term emergent property for
the  phenomenal  result  of  the  (unconscious)
process of perceptual organization. It would vi-
olate our everyday experience to call something
we see an illusion just because we know a little
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Figure 7: Is the circle in the middle perceived to be big-
ger than it really is? Possibly an illusiond.
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bit about the underlying physics. Just because
we know that our continuous motion percept is
derived from a sequence of discrete images, this
does not make the percept an illusion (neither
illusionm  nor  llusiond).2 By  the  same  token,
knowing that light is a wave (or a stream of
photons) does not make objects in the world il-
lusory. In fact, a discrepancy between what is
really there and what we perceive is the norm,
not  the  exception.  Given  my conceptual  dis-
tinction, I will show how the perceptual system
deals with the ubiquitous discrepancy, with the
normal  case  of  illusiond.  The  relatively  rare
cases illusionsm  arise a by-product of this pro-
cess. For something to deserve the name illu-
sion, this discrepancy has to become manifest.
The Ebbinghaus illusion only turns into an il-
lusionm when we perceive a conflict, when the
inner circles are seen (or inferred) to be equal
in size and they look different in size at the
same time. Thus, it is not the ubiquitous pres-
ence of error that makes an illusionm but the
rather  unusual  case  where  this  error  is  un-
masked by a perceptual comparison process.
2 Note, that a discrepancy between stimulus and percept is necessary
but not sufficient for an illusionm. Thus, all illusions require an illu-
siond but will only become illusionsm in some cases. My distinction is
capable of sorting out illusions as relevant to perceptual psychology,
it does, however, not speak to the question of how we can describe
the physical stimulus in the first place, i.e., the grand illusion argu-
ment (see http://www.imprint.co.uk/books/noe.html).
1.3.1 A note on so-called cognitive 
illusionsd
In  our  everyday perception,  once  we consider
that  objects  are  often  in  motion  and  carry
meaning at  the perceptual  level  (see  Gibson’s
concept of affordance, e.g., 1979) the UP is ex-
acerbated  but  not  changed.  I  argue  that  the
nature of perceptual error is akin to cognitive
error when it comes to the more complex and
meaning-laden percepts of everyday perception,
as opposed to line drawings that are typically
referred to in the context of illusionsm. Just as
with perceptual errors, cognitive errors often do
not become manifest. However, if  they do be-
come manifest, they can typically be corrected
with much greater ease than can perceptual il-
lusionsm, which may well be the distinguishing
feature between perceptual and cognitive error.
Cognitive errors become noticeable more indir-
ectly by recurring to a short-term memory of a
dissenting fact or by reasoning—which is often
faulty by itself.  The literature about cognitive
error  is  enormous.  To  give  one  classical  ex-
ample, we have trouble with simple syllogistic
reasoning,  in  particular  if  negations  are  used.
Wason’s famous selection task (Wason & John-
son-Laird 1972) shows how limited our abilities
are (Figure 9). Imagine you have four envelopes
in front of you. You are to test the statement “if
there  is  sender  information  on  the  back  side
then there is a stamp on the front”. Which of
the 4 envelopes do you have to turn over? Do
not turn over any envelope unnecessarily. 
Figure 9: Which envelopes do you have to turn to test
the statement “If there is sender information on the back
side then there is a stamp on the front”? 
Well—it is easy to see that envelope 1 has
to be turned (modus ponens), but then it gets
harder.  Many observers think that envelope 2
needs  to  be  turned.  However,  this  is  not  the
case. Only 4 has to be turned in addition to 1.
Hecht, H. (2015). Beyond Illusions - On the Limitations of Perceiving Relational Properties.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 18(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570290 6 | 26
Figure  8:  Is the circle surrounded by smaller circles
perceived to be bigger than it really is, or is the center
circle on the right perceived to be too small? This is
the  famous  Titchener  illusionm that  was  invented  by
Hermann  Ebbinghaus  and  first  reported  by  Wilhelm
Wundt (1898).
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A sender  on  its  back  would  violate  the  rule
(modus  tollens).  The  majority  of  college  stu-
dents fail to solve this problem, but as soon as
the context is changed, all mistakes can be elim-
inated. In the context of screening for drinking
underage, all observers perform accurately (see
Figure  10).  Here  again  1  and  4  need  to  be
“turned  over”.  Only  by  thinking  the  problem
through or by noticing that the problem struc-
ture is  identical  to  the envelope scenario  and
the wine drinking scenario  does the error  be-
come manifest. We may or may not want to call
it a cognitive illusion. This term is not widely
used for such mistakes or fallacies, with the ex-
ception  of  Gerd  Gigerenzer  and  his  research
group  (see  e.g.,  Hertwig &  Ortmann 2005).
However, even if we call these mistakes cognit-
ive illusions, they are different in nature from
perceptual illusionsm (which typically contain a
judgmental  aspect).  We do not  readily  notice
cognitive  illusions.  Although  the  distinction
between perception and cognition has outlived
itself (and cannot me made with clarity to be-
gin with, see above), for practical convenience, I
will  continue  to  use  the  terms  to  emphasize
cases where deliberate thought processes enter
the equation. We happily live with many a fal-
lacy  without  ever  noticing.  Millions  went
through their lives believing in impetus theory
and seeing the sun circle around the earth, let
alone  holding  seemingly  absurd  beliefs  about
the shape of our planet. 
Figure  10:  Whom do you have to query about age or
beverage  type  to  test  if  “Only  adults  have  alcoholic
beverages  in  their  glass”?  It  is  obvious  that  the  juice
drinker and the elderly person need not be queried.
Errors only turn into illusionsm when we
become aware of  them and at the same time
cannot correct the error (easily). Just try to see
the earth rotate rather than see the sun rise. It
is impossible. We continue to see the sun rise
above  a  stable  horizon,  never  the  other  way
around. And we continue to misjudge implica-
tion rules or widen the grasp of our fingers a
tad  more  when  reaching  for  an  Ebbinghaus
stimulus even if we know about the illusion (see
Franz et  al. 2000).  Other  errors  can  only  be
spotted when large data samples are collected
and analyzed statistically. For instance, to ex-
pert golfers, the putting hole on the green looks
larger than it does to novices (Witt et al. 2008;
Proffitt &  Linkenauger 2013). They will never
become aware of  this  fact,  although the  fine-
grained scaling of perception as function of skill
might  be  functional  during  skill  acquisition.
Spectacular  as  they  may  be,  such  errors  of
which we are unaware should not be called illu-
sionsm because almost all  our perceptions and
cognitions  contain  some  degree  of  error.  We
may believe that a rolling ball comes to a stop
because it has used up its impetus, or we may
hold that we should aim where we want a mov-
ing ball to go rather than using the appropriate
vector addition to determine where to aim. As
long as our action results do not force us to re-
consider,  our  convictions  will  remain  un-
changed. One could say that we have a model of
the world, or its workings, that suffices for our
purposes. 
Figure 11: Technical illustration explaining the traject-
ory  of  a  cannon  projectile  by  Daniel  Santbech  (1561):
Problematum Astronomicorum, Basel.
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Why are  so  many  researchers  willing  to
call a small manifest discrepancy between two
percepts of  the same object an illusion,  while
gross  deviations  of  perception  or  conception
from physical reality are not deemed to deserve
the same name? Take the straight-down belief
(not  illusion).  Many observers  take  an  object
that is being released from a moving carrier to
fall  straight  down  rather  than  in  a  parabola
(McCloskey et  al. 1983).  Figure  11 illustrates
this  belief  as  it  was  state-of-the-art  physics
knowledge  from Aristotle  through  the  Middle
Ages. It persists today in cognition and percep-
tion.  Even when impossible  events of  straight
down  trajectories  are  shown  in  animated
movies, to some observers they look better than
do the correct parabolas (Kaiser et al. 1992).
Note  that  there  was  a  discussion  at  the
time whether or not the transition from the up-
ward impetus to the downward impetus was im-
mediate or if a third circular impetus inserted
itself,  such  that  there  were  be  two trajectory
changes.  The  intermediary  could  only  be
thought of as linear or as a circular arc—any-
thing else would have been too far from divine
perfection.  Presumably,  the  more  principled
physicists  before  Galileo  favored  the  simple
transition.  Others,  such  as  Aristotle  himself,
presumably preferred the interstition of the cir-
cular arc, as it would reconcile trajectory obser-
vation with the physics of the time. The pre-
Newtonian  thinking  about  projectile  motion
nicely illustrates that we see the world as in ac-
cord with our actions. To the medieval cannon-
eer,  what  he  saw and understood about  pro-
jectiles was sufficiently accurate, given the vari-
ance introduced by the inconsistent quality of
the  gunpowder  and  the  fluctuation  in  the
weight of cannon balls at the time. 
Thus, we have argued that visual illusionsm,
just as cognitive illusionsm, have to become mani-
fest to be called such. They are a special and rare
case in which the discrepancy between a percept
and what an ideal observer should have seen in-
stead is noticed. Normally this discrepancy goes
unnoticed. We will now take a look at why it goes
unnoticed and argue that an illusiond will only al-
ter perception if it interferes seriously with our
action  requirements.  As  the  latter  vary among
people, illusionsd can be private and may be very
far from the truth—as, for instance, in the con-
text of projectile motion (see Hecht & Bertamini
2000). The private aspect of perception is to be
taken as unconscious in the sense of Helmholtz.
For instance, we do not only think that a baseball
thrown toward a catcher will accelerate after it
has left the thrower’s hand (which may even be
incompatible with impetus theory), but doctored
visual scenes in which the ball does accelerate are
judged as perfectly natural looking. This amounts
to the perceptual analogue of what  Herbert Si-
mon (1990) has called satisficing in the domain of
reasoning and intuitive judgment. The visual sys-
tem searches until it has found a solution that is
satisfactory, regardless of how far away it is from
a veridical representation of the world.
To conclude this section, we believe that
perception of objects, be it the stick in the wa-
ter or a falling brick, is a solution to the under-
specification  problem.  Perception  is  always
fraught with error in the sense of a discrepancy
between the percept and the underlying physics.
This error only becomes manifest when a simple
perceptual  judgment  or  comparison  reveals  a
contradiction. In all other cases the error goes
unnoticed. Two such cases will now be described
at length to make the point that perceptual illu-
siond is the rule rather than the exception.
2 Two case studies or how we deal with 
error
The study of geometric illusions or overestimation
of slope, distance, and size as a function of situ-
atedness misleads us into believing that percep-
tion normally reveals the true state of affairs. The
finding that golf holes look slightly bigger to ex-
perts  as  compared  to  inexperienced  golfers  is
spectacular because and only if we assume that
perception is normally veridical. This is, however,
not the case. Normally, our grasp of the physical
world is rather limited. I present novel data from
two everyday domains that differ from the stand-
ard examples of intuitive physics in a crucial way.
They  deal  with  the  understanding  (first  case
study) and the perception (second case study) of
relational  properties,  rather  than  with  more
straight-forward perception of simple properties.
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Seeing the color of an object or its size, predicting
its motion trajectory, etc., refer to simple proper-
ties. Most everyday activities, however, involve re-
lational properties. We need to see and predict
how we might interact with objects in the world.
This interaction depends on our own makeup, on
the  object’s  properties,  and  on  the  relation
between the two. For instance, to judge whether a
slope might be too slippery for us to walk on de-
pends on the quality of the soles of my shoes, the
surface texture of the slope, and also on their in-
teraction.  A  polished  hardwood  ramp  may  be
slippery if I am wearing shoes with leather soles,
but it may be very sticky if I am barefoot.
The two case studies that follow are inten-
ded to illustrate in detail how limited our un-
derstanding  of  relational  properties  is  in  gen-
eral,  and to  show that  we have  to  make de-
cisions in the face of poor perception that may
have serious consequences.
2.1 Case study: Balancing as a relational
property
Before you read on, please take a minute to solve
six questions about the depicted falling rods. Solu-
tions will be provided later. Note that in tasks 1
through 3 (see Figure 12,  13, 14), the scenario is
as follows. Two rods are held upright, but they are
very slightly tipped to one side (by exactly equal
amounts), such that they will fall once released.
They are released at exactly the same moment.
Which one will hit the ground sooner? In tasks 4–
6, you are to judge the ease of balancing such a
rod on the tip of your index finger. 
Task  4  asks  about  the  same  rods  as  in
Task 1, but the question is whether the wooden
or the steel rod would be easier to balance on
the tip of your index finger.
Task 5 asks whether the short steel rod or
the longer wooden rod of equal weight would be
easier to balance on the index finger. And finally,
Task 6 asks whether a weight attached to a given
rod would make it easier to balance, and if so,
where it best be attached (top, center, bottom).
In a large survey, we tested the intuitive know-
ledge of a large number of college students about
these tasks. Note that we tested such that each
subject only had to solve one of the six tasks. 
2.1.1 Methods detail
180 college students (123 women, 57 men, age
M = 24.9  SD = 5.9,  ranging  from 18  to  53
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Figure  12:  Task 1:  The rod on the left is  light, it is
made of wood; the rod on the right is heavier because it
is made of iron. If they begin to tip over at the same mo-
ment in time, which one will fall faster?
Figure  13:  In Task 2 the rods are equally heavy but
have different lengths. The left rod is made of wood; the
rod on the right is shorter but has the same weight as it
is made of steel. Which one will fall faster?
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years) volunteered to participate in the survey.
We used a paper-and-pencil test to investigate
the subjects’ knowledge and to obtain their es-
timates about which objects would be easier to
balance. The six tasks were explained carefully
and illustrated with drawings similar to those
shown in Figure 12, 13 and 14.
Each task was presented to 30 students.
Tasks 1–3 were used to test intuitive knowledge
without referring or alluding to the act of bal-
ancing. Merely the process of falling from an al-
most upright position to a horizontal position
had to be judged. In the first task (Figure 12),
subjects saw two rods of equal length (1m) but
of  different  material  and weight.  The wooden
rod was said to weigh 40g, the steel rod 400g.
The  accompanying  information  text  indicated
that both rods were slightly tipped over at the
exact  same  time,  for  instance  by  a  minimal
breeze. The wooden rod was to take exactly 1.5
seconds to fall from its upright position to the
horizontal. We had tested the falling speed of
such rods and measured it to be approximately
1.5s. The subjects were asked to estimate the
fall-duration of the steel rod. The second (Fig-
ure  13)  task  showed  two  rods  of  equal  mass
(40g) but different length (rod 1 = 100cm, rod
2 = 36cm). The information text was the same
as in Task 1. The third task (Figure 14) showed
two  rods  of  equal  length  (1m)  and  weight
(220g).  However,  an  additional  small  object
(220g) was placed respectively toward the top
or the bottom of the rod (rod 1 = 10cm from
the bottom, rod 2 = 90cm from the bottom).
The  accompanying  information  text  indicated
that both rods would be tipped over by a min-
imal breeze and that it took rod 1 exactly 1.5
seconds to fall to a horizontal position. Subjects
were to estimate the fall-duration of rod 2. 
Tasks  4–6  used  the  same  rods  but  the
questions about them were couched in the con-
text of balancing. This should evoke experiences
that subjects may have made when balancing or
hefting objects. Thus, rather than asking which
rod would fall quicker, we asked which would be
easier to balance.
The fourth task showed the same two rods
of  equal  length  (1m)  but  different  weights
(wooden rod = 40g, heavy steel  rod = 400g)
that had been used for Task 1 (Figure 12). The
subjects were asked to indicate which rod they
thought they could better balance on the tip of
one finger, typically the index finger. The pos-
sible answers ranged from 1 (“rod 1 much bet-
ter than rod 2”) to 7 (“rod 2 much better than
rod 1”). The fifth task (Figure 13) showed two
rods of equal weight (40g) but different length
(rod 1 = 100cm, rod  2 = 36cm).  Again,  the
subjects were asked to indicate which rod they
could  better  balance  with  one  finger.  Task  6
showed one rod (length = 1m, weight = 220g).
Subjects had to indicate the position that they
would place an additional small object (mass =
220g)  to  get  optimal  balancing  characteristics
(from 10cm = bottom to 100cm = top). It was
made clear that the weight would not come into
contact with the balancing hand even when it
was placed at the bottom. 
2.1.2 Results
People  who  cannot  draw  on  formal  physics
training to answer the six tasks have a rather
poor  intuitive  understanding  of  falling  rods.
Neglecting air resistance, the rate of falling is
determined by how high the center of gravity
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Figure 14: In Task 3, the two rods are identical in ma-
terial,  length,  and  weight.  An  additional  weight  is  at-
tached either at the bottom or at the top. Which rod will
fall faster?
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(barycenter)  is  above  the  ground.  The  rod’s
mass is  irrelevant.  Thus, rods of  equal  length
(mass  distribution  is  assumed to  be  uniform)
fall at the same rate, but the shorter rod falls
quicker  than  its  longer  counterpart.  By  the
same token, a weight attached to the tip of the
rod should cause it to fall more slowly because
it moves the barycenter closer to the tip.
In  general,  the  subjects  estimated  their
knowledge in the natural sciences to be moder-
ate when asked to judge it on a six-point scale
ranging from very poor (1) to very good (6).
Mathematics knowledge (M = 3.62, SD = 1.13)
was judged better (t(179)  = 11.98,  p  < .001)
than physics knowledge (M = 2.56, SD = 1.26).
The men estimated their knowledge somewhat
higher than did the women, for physics (t(178)
= 8.8,  p  < .001) and mathematics (t(178)  =
2.34, p < .05).
Task 1: In reality, both rods fall with the
same speed, as Galileo Galilei showed in 1590
with the help of several experiments about free
fall (e.g.,  Hermann 1981). The falling speed is
independent of their mass as long as air resist-
ance  is  negligible.  Thus,  1.5  seconds  was  the
right answer. 40% of the test subjects answered
correctly. 43.3% estimated that the heavier rod
would fall faster, while 16.7% estimated that it
would fall more slowly. 
Task 2: Because of the lower barycenter
the shorter rod falls faster and its fall-duration
is  briefer  than 1.5  seconds.  46.7% of  the test
subjects indicated this. 44.3% thought that the
fall-duration would be the same and 10% estim-
ated  that  the  shorter  rod  would  fall  more
slowly.
Task 3: Because of the higher barycenter,
the second rod falls more slowly. Therefore, its
fall-duration  is  longer  than 1.5  seconds.  Only
20% of the subjects chose the right answer. 50%
estimated that the rod with the higher barycen-
ter would fall faster and 30% estimated that it
would fall at the same rate.
There is a direct link between the fall-dur-
ation of  an object  and the ability to balance
this  object.  The  longer  the  fall-duration,  the
more time there should be to move the balan-
cing finger right underneath the barycenter, and
hence the easier to balance (a moderate weight
assumed). We confirmed this hypothesis empir-
ically in several experiments where subjects ac-
tually  had to  balance  different  rods  to which
weights  were  attached  at  different  heights.
Thus, we can predict the ability to balance dif-
ferent objects by comparing their fall-duration. 
Task 4: Here, the rods (same length, dif-
ferent  weight)  had  the  same  fall-duration—so
the ability to balance them can be assumed to
be the same, too. This was recognized by only
3.3% of the test subjects, while 73% favored the
heavier rod, and 23.3% the lighter one.
Task 5 (two rods, same weight, different
length): Because of the longer fall-duration the
longer  rod  is  easier  to  balance.  This  was  as-
sumed by 56.7% of the subjects. 20% estimated
both rods to be equal and 23.3% thought the
shorter one would be easier to balance.
Task  6 (additional  weight):  The  higher
the barycenter the longer the fall-duration—and
with it the ease of balancing. Therefore, the ad-
ditional object should be placed at the top of
the rod. This was indicated by 33.3% of the test
subjects. The majority of 43.3% chose the bot-
tom for placing the object,  and 23.3 % chose
positions between bottom and top.
In sum, the intuitive knowledge about the
fall of different objects is rather spotty. About
half of the subjects knew that fall-duration is
independent of mass (Task 1) and that shorter
objects fall  faster (Task 2), only 20% realized
that the position of the barycenter is relevant
and that  the  fall-duration  increases  when the
barycenter is shifted to the upper end of the rod
(Task 3). This is remarkable because on a daily
basis we handle objects whose barycenter differs
from the geometrical center, for instance a filled
vs. an empty soup ladle, top-heavy tennis rack-
ets, etc. 
Asking directly about the act of balancing
did  not  reveal  superior  understanding.  When
asked  about  their  ability  to  balance  objects,
people do know that longer objects are easier to
balance than shorter ones, but they do not seem
to realize that the mass of the object is irrelev-
ant (Tasks 4 and 5). In other words, although a
majority of our subjects was able to recognize
that  mass  is  irrelevant  for  fall  duration,  they
failed to see the irrelevance of mass in the rela-
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tional  balancing task.  The involvement of  the
own  motor  action  appears  to  have  made  the
judgment  task  more  difficult.  The  important
role of the position of the barycenter (i.e., mass
distribution, Task 6) went equally unnoticed in
the falling and the balancing tasks. In general,
knowledge about balancing properties and the
underlying physical principles can be described
as rather moderate. Do experts have a superior
understanding of these principles?
2.2 Extending the case study: Comparing 
physics experts with non-experts 
As all subjects had judged their physics know-
ledge to be rather limited, we chose to test a
group with formal physics training on the bal-
ancing questions. We also tested a social science
control group and added two new tasks. Tasks
1–3 were dropped from the study, while Tasks
4–6 were included. To test for a specific heur-
istic, namely that heavy objects are harder to
balance, the following two tasks were added:
Task 7: The question “Does a weight help
and if so, where would you place it?” was posed
with respect to the much lighter wooden rod (m
= 40g).  Thus,  Task  6  was  replicated  with  a
lighter rod. Finally, a more fine-graded question
was added to assess by how much expert know-
ledge would be superior to normal knowledge, if
at all:
Task 8: The eighth task showed four rods
of the same material (steel, length 90cm). On
three of them, a weight was attached at differ-
ent positions (as shown in Figure 15). The sub-
jects  had  to  order  them  according  to  which
would be easiest to balance on the tip of one
finger. Note that the height of the barycenter
matters.  It is  equally located in the center of
rods B and D.
2.2.1 Methods detail
Participants:  84  college  students,  mainly  of
Psychology (69 women,  15 men,  age ranging
from 19 to 66 years) and 113 college students
of  Physics,  Mathematics,  and  Chemistry  (41
women,  72  men,  age  ranging  from 18  to  27
years) were tested. The students of mathemat-
ics,  physics,  and  chemistry  estimated  their
knowledge in mathematics (M = 2.65,  SD  =
1.02) and physics (M = 2.68,  SD  = 1.07) to
be moderate. The men estimated their know-
ledge of physics to be higher than did the wo-
men (t(111) = -4.34, p < .001). No difference
was  found  for  self-assessed  maths  skills
(t(111) = -.22, p=.83). 
A  paper-and-pencil  test  was  used  to  in-
vestigate the assumptions subjects  held about
the effect of  various object properties on how
easily  the  respective  rods  could  be  balanced.
The test booklet included eight tasks: one per
page.  Each  task  consisted  of  a  hypothetical
scenario  illustrated  by  a  drawing.  Different
pseudo-random orders  of  the eight  tasks  were
executed by all students. Tasks that built upon
one  another  were  kept  in  their  logical  order.
Once a given task was finished, the page had to
be turned. It was not permitted to go back to a
previous page. Depending on the task, subjects
had to make a binary choice (pick one or an-
swer yes or no) or they had to grade their an-
swers on a seven-point scale, according to how
sure they were that one alternative would win
over the other (certain win, very likely, some-
what  likely,  equal  chance,  somewhat  unlikely,
very unlikely, certain loss). 
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Figure 15: In Task 8, the four rods labeled A–D should
be sorted according to the difficulty of balancing them.
The correct order is C–B–D–A or C–D–B–A.
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2.2.2 Results and discussion
Task 4  (equal length,  different weight of  the
rods): Only 3.6 % of all social science students
produced the correct solution and stated that
the wooden and the steel rod would be equally
hard to balance. Half of them thought that the
steel rod would be easier to balance, and the re-
maining  subjects  chose  the  wooden rod.  This
corresponds  well  to  the  results  obtained  with
the first large student sample. The physics stu-
dents,  in  contrast,  performed  better  albeit
nowhere near perfection. 22% of them chose the
correct  answer.  21% thought  the  wooden rod
would be easier  to balance, and 57% thought
the steel rod would be easier to balance. Thus,
social scientists equally chose one or the other
whereas physicists preferred the metal rod, and
at most one fifth of them knew the correct an-
swer (provided they were not just guessing bet-
ter than the social science students).
Task 5 (equal  weight,  different  length):
Half  of  the  social  science students (53%) cor-
rectly  thought  that  the  longer  rod  would  be
easier  to  balance,  and  less  than  2%  thought
that  length  did  not  matter.  The  physics  stu-
dents did  noticeably  better:  76%  chose  the
longer rod, and only 20% thought the shorter
rod would be easier to balance. 4% thought it
would be the same with both rods. 
In  Task 6 (attach  weight  to  steel  rod):
60.7%  of  the  social  scientists thought  that  a
weight  would  make  it  easier.  When  asked  to
place the weight, only 9.5% put it in the top
third (for analysis purposes the rod was divided
in three equal parts), and 44% placed it at the
bottom  third.  Physics  students fared  a  little
better.  A  mere  44  %  thought  that  a  weight
would  improve  balancing,  but  those  who  did
correctly placed the weight at the top (40% of
all physics students).
Task 7 (attach  weight  to  light  wooden
rod):  Not  surprisingly,  performance  was  very
similar  to  Task 6 (r= 0.76).  If  anything,  the
rod’s  being  lighter  improved  performance.
77.4%  of  the  social  scientists thought  that  a
weight  would  make  it  easier.  When  asked  to
place the weight, only 19% put it  in the top
third. 45.2% put the weight in the bottom sec-
tion,  and the remaining students placed it  in
the middle section of the rod. Physics students
fared a little better. 81% thought that a weight
would improve balancing. However, the correct
placement at the top was made by only 40%.
Thus,  in  light  of  the  results  from Task  6,  it
seems that those who knew the correct answer
were  unimpressed  by  the  weight  of  the  rod.
However,  among  those  experts  who  merely
guessed and suspected that weight would make
a difference, they guessed so more often when
the rod was lighter—increasing the salience of
the weight.
Task 8 (order  the  rods):  Social  science
students:  According  to  the  reasoning  that  a
greater moment of inertia should facilitate bal-
ancing (note that this will  not hold for much
heavier rods), the correct order is C, B = D, A.
Not  a  single  subject  produced  this  answer.
16.7%  chose  the  order  A,  B,  D,  C;  another
16.7% chose A, D, B, C. Only one subject con-
sidered a tie, albeit with a wrong ordering (B,
D, A=C).
Physics students: Notably, 6% of the sub-
jects did give the correct answer of CBDA or
CDBA.  94%  of  the  subjects  answered  incor-
rectly.  Thus,  the  physics  students  were some-
what more knowledgeable than the social  sci-
ence students.
In sum, the errors we make in perceiving
the balancing properties  of  simple objects  are
large. The important variable of mass distribu-
tion is ignored entirely. We plainly do not see
how an object is best balanced until we try it
out, even though we balance objects on a daily
basis.  Most if  not all  observers are unable to
correctly  imagine  or  remember past  balancing
acts.  Formal  physics  training  has  surprisingly
little effect on the paper-and-pencil task for as-
sessing falling and balancing of rods. Note that
the  classical  mechanics  knowledge  that  would
help solve the problem should have been held
by all natural science students involved in the
study.  The  fact  that  their  answers  were  only
slightly superior to novice intuitions is stunning.
Why  is  the  textbook  knowledge  of  classical
mechanics so frail that it has not been internal-
ized, such as to inform our intuitive judgments
or  at  least  facilitate  our  textbook  learning?
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Throughout  evolution  we  had  to  handle  and
wield objects by balancing them. One might ar-
gue that such knowledge is not available to the
ventral  processing  stream  (see  Milner &
Goodale 2008).  However,  in  further  tests  we
confirmed that performance in our tasks did not
improve when we let subjects wield a rod before
filling out the questionnaire.  Even though ob-
servers are able to feel how long a stick is when
wielding it while being blindfolded (see  Turvey
& Carello 1995), they are unable to exploit the
available  perceptual  cues  that  inform  them
about  the  balancing  properties  of  an  object.
Thus, although we know shockingly little about
balancing, it seems to be sufficient to guide our
daily actions. We correctly see longer sticks as
being easier to balance, but we fail to see the
importance  of  mass  distribution.  Even  when
educated by formal  physics  training,  our  per-
formance becomes only slightly more sophistic-
ated.  The  gap  between  percept  and  reality
closes  merely  by  a  small  amount.  It  appears
that  the  visual  systems  of  different  observers
adopt  different  private  models  that  often  in-
clude rod length but not mass distribution. 
2.3 The second case study: Visual cues to
friction
Let us now look at another relational property
that  may have  more  serious  consequences  for
our health: friction. If we misbalance an object,
we may break it, but if we misjudge the slipper-
iness  of  the  surface  we walk  on,  we may get
hurt.  We need to  avoid  accidents  on  slippery
ground and we have to estimate the force we
need to apply to hold an object. Importantly,
we often cannot wait for haptic cues to make
this information available, but typically we have
to make the underlying judgment of slipperiness
on the basis of visual cues. The mere look of a
wet slope may be all we have to guide our de-
cision  to  tread  forcefully  or  to  hold  on  to  a
hand-rail and walk gingerly. The human ability
to make such visual assessments of slipperiness
is not well explored. We hold that this is be-
cause friction is not a simple surface property
but rather a relational property, which can only
be determined by relative characteristics of two
surfaces. In other words, the fact that a surface
is rough does not imply high friction, and the
fact  that  a surface  is  smooth does  not  imply
that it is slippery. Plastic for instance, can be
very sticky on human skin but very slippery on
wool or felt.
In what follows, we provide an overview of
friction perception and briefly introduce venues
to visual and haptic roughness perception. Then
we report two experiments that were conducted
to assess visual and haptic judgments of friction
between surfaces.
2.3.1 Friction as a relational property vs. 
surface roughness 
Some surfaces afford walking on whereas others
do not. The information that allows the organ-
ism to make potentially critical decisions about
where to tread or how strong a grip should be
is based on a variety of perceptual dimensions
(see e.g., Michaels & Carello 1981). Even when
ample  opportunity  is  given  to  haptically  ex-
plore the surface, its felt roughness is not ne-
cessarily the same as the friction between the
exploring hand and the surface, let alone the
friction between the sole of the shoe and the
surface. For instance, if our hand is moist we
feel  high  friction  when  exploring  a  polished
marble floor and at the same time we feel it to
be very smooth. We may even perceive it  as
slippery—factoring  in  the  effect  of  dry  vs.
moist hands. 
Tactile  competence  regarding  perceptual
access to roughness of surfaces appears to be
rather sophisticated (for a state-of-the-art re-
view  of  haptic  perception  see  Lederman &
Klatzky 2009). In essence, haptic perception of
surface roughness is better when the surface is
explored dynamically as opposed to statically.
Errors are generally rather small. More inter-
estingly,  several  studies  have  demonstrated
that cross-modal sensory information (e.g., vis-
ion and touch) can lead to better estimates of
a texture’s roughness (e.g., Heller 1982). Other
research has also shown that different sensory
modalities are weighted about equally when es-
timating the roughness of textures (Lederman
& Abbott 1981; Lederman et al. 1986).
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Even by mere visual inspection, observers
are able to see how rough a surface is (Leder-
man & Klatzky 2009). Such findings may have
tempted researchers to unduly reduce friction to
surface roughness. For instance, in the ergonom-
ics context of accident analysis, slipperiness of
work  surfaces  is  typically  operationalized  by
surface roughness, with the implicit or explicit
assumption that roughness is good enough an
approximation of friction (see e.g., Chang 1999;
Chang et al. 2001; Grönqvist et al. 2001). How-
ever, friction is a rather complicated property
between surfaces, for one because it is subject
to change with the amount of pressure one ap-
plies or with the speed at which the surfaces
move relative to one another. And people ap-
pear  to  have  some  difficulty  judging  friction
(Joh et al. 2007).
Let us consider the case of a square block
of cement on a large wooden surface. The heav-
ier the block, the higher the friction coefficient.
And the rougher the surface of the block the
higher the friction coefficient. Thus, friction is a
function of the force applied to a given surface,
of area, and of roughness. Children and adults
seem to be able to perceptually appreciate some
but not all of the above-mentioned three com-
ponents of friction. This intuitive knowledge de-
velops with age. Adults have some insight into
the multiplicative relation between the weight of
an object and its surface texture in cases where
the object  is  pulled  across  a  surface,  whereas
nine-year-old children seem to assume a simpler
additive relationship (Frick et al. 2006).
Friction  is  defined  by  the  interaction
between  two  surfaces,  and  its  estimation  re-
quires  knowledge about how different surfaces
can interact. Thus, the seemingly simple visual
percept that we have of a surface as “slippery”
is a rather complex physical relation that per-
tains between properties of the surface and the
contact object. Physically, slipperiness is indic-
ated by the friction coefficient between two sur-
faces, which is usually measured by placing an
object on an adjustable ramp. As the steepness
of the ramp increases, one determines the angle
at which the object starts to slip (static fric-
tion)  or  when the object  starts  to  move uni-
formly (kinetic friction).
We can haptically judge the roughness of
surfaces, and we are also able—to some degree
—to haptically judge the friction between sur-
faces.  Grierson & Carnahan (2006) have shown
that individuals can haptically perceive slipperi-
ness; that is estimates were significantly correl-
ated  with  the  friction  coefficients  between an
object’s surface and skin. In their first experi-
ment, they showed that tangential motion is re-
quired to judge the friction coefficient realistic-
ally. In a second experiment, they examined the
force people applied to lift an object with a cer-
tain weight and surface structure. The applied
force was often higher than necessary. Next to
nothing  is  known  about  our  ability  to  judge
slipperiness based on visual information.
2.3.2 Slipperiness Experiment: Visual 
cues to friction of familiar surfaces
Vision has been shown to improve haptic judg-
ments  in  endoscopic  surgery.  Within  a  simu-
lated endoscopic environment, Perreault & Cao
(2006) tested the effects of vision and friction
on haptic perception by measuring for how long
participants held on to the objects with the sur-
gery tool. In a second experiment, participants
had to compare the softness of pairs of simu-
lated  tissue.  The  experiments  showed  that
visual and haptic feedback were equally import-
ant for the task. This suggests that visual cues
can be exploited to judge slipperiness.
Presumably the main visual cue for pre-
dicting slipperiness or friction is shine (gloss, re-
flection, etc.) of a surface. Joh, Adolph, Camp-
bell & Eppler (2006) explored which visual in-
formation can serve as a warning of low friction
surfaces.  They  asked  their  participants  which
cues they use to identify slippery ground, and
tested whether visual information is reliable for
the  judgment  of  slipperiness  under  different
conditions  (indoor  and  outdoor  lightening).
Walkers  seem to rely on shine for selecting a
safer,  less slippery path, even though shine is
not a very reliable visual cue for indicating slip-
pery ground. 
With two experiments we attempted to as-
sess, in more general terms, the ability to perceive
slipperiness. In our first experiment, we tried to
Hecht, H. (2015). Beyond Illusions - On the Limitations of Perceiving Relational Properties.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 18(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570290 15 | 26
www.open-mind.net
find out to what extent visual and haptic inform-
ation enables us to estimate friction between two
surfaces and, in particular, how far visual cues in
isolation decrease the ability to judge friction. In
our second experiment, we manipulated the visual
appearance of given surfaces to explore the effects
of  glossiness,  contrast,  and  undulation  on  per-
ceived friction.
Every day we encounter different types of
surfaces with which we are in contact. In these
situations  we  do  not  really  think  about  how
much force is to be exerted in order to create
sufficient friction, be it between the fingers and
the object we are grasping or between the sole
of  our  shoes  and the  surface  of  the  road  we
tread. Nonetheless, we rarely accidentally drop
an object or slip on the road. Thus, we must
have some degree of intuitive knowledge about
the friction of surfaces. The experiment sought
to find out, first, if this is really the case, and
then which sensory information might guide our
estimates of friction.
2.3.3 Methods detail
33 female and 31 male subjects between 18 and
52 years of age (M = 25.3;  SD  = 6.6) volun-
teered  and were  paid  for  participating  in  the
study. All  had normal or corrected to normal
vision, and no one reported haptic impairments.
Ten different types of surfaces (see Figure
16)  were  glued  onto  separate  thin  quadratic
tiles of wood with a size of 10 x 10cm. The sur-
faces were sheets of Teflon, pan liner, smooth
and  rough  foam rubber,  cloth,  felt  (soft  and
hard), and three different grades of sandpaper.
Two  common  reference  surfaces  were
picked:  human  skin  and  smooth  untreated
wood. That is, the participants had to estimate
the friction of the above ten surfaces with re-
spect to one or the other of the two reference
surfaces, skin or wood.
To measure the perceived friction, a ramp
was used. Its slope could be adjusted to a steep-
ness corresponding to the setting where the tile
was  judged  to  start  sliding  down.  The  ramp
consisted of two wooden boards connected with
a hinge. It was placed in front of the participant
and could be continuously adjusted (see Figure
17). A measuring stick was attached to the top
of the ramp such that the experimenter could
easily record the height of the ramp while the
participant saw only the unmarked side of the
measuring stick. The height settings were then
converted  to  slope  angle,  which  in  turn  was
used  to  determine  the  friction  force  acting
between ramp and probe surface.
Figure  16:  The ten materials used in the first experi-
ment.  Top  row  from  left  to  right:  Teflon,  pan  liner,
smooth and rough foam rubber, cloth. Bottom row from
left: felt (soft and hard), three different grades of sandpa-
per (320, 180, 40 in that order). All materials were moun-
ted on identical square wooden tiles. The matchstick is
shown to provide scale information, it was not there in
the experiment.
The slope of  the ramp used to estimate
the  friction  of  the  different  surfaces  could  be
varied from 0 to 90 degrees. We computed coef-
ficients of estimated static friction for the sub-
sequent analyses using the following equation:
μH = FR / FN (friction coefficient = fric-
tion force / weight)
A 4 x 2 x 10 design was used, with one
four-level  between-subjects  factor  (Condition),
and two within-subject factors, Reference Sur-
face (two levels:  skin and wood), and Surface
Material (ten levels: Teflon, pan liner, smooth
and  rough  foam rubber,  cloth,  felt  (soft  and
hard), and three different grades of sandpaper).
The factor Condition consisted of different
instructions for exploring the surface materials
(see Table 1). In the haptic-visual condition, ob-
servers were asked to touch the surfaces and to
visually inspect them. In the haptic condition,
the surfaces were hidden in a box at all times
and could only be explored haptically.  In the
visual condition, observers were not allowed to
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touch the surfaces but could inspect them visu-
ally.  In the photo condition,  finally,  observers
merely viewed photographs of all ten surfaces.
The same photographs as depicted in Figure 16
were used, with the exception that the match
was  not  present.  The  photographs  were  the
same size as the actual tiles (10 x 10 cm). 
Subjects  were allowed to look at the re-
spective reference surface (skin or wood) before
making a set of judgments based on this refer-
ence  surface.  They were  also  allowed and en-
couraged to touch the reference surface regard-
less of the condition in which they were tested.
That is, even the group that could only visually
inspect the test surfaces had visual and haptic
experience of the generic reference surface. The
ramp itself was not to be touched in this phase
of the experiment, in order to ensure that the
groups did not differ in how they explored the
ramp. To envision the friction of skin, subjects
were instructed to touch the inner side of their
forearm, and to envision the friction of wood,
they had a piece of wood (the same wood also
used for the ramp) lying in front of them that
they could touch. Half of the participants star-
ted  with  wood  as  reference  and  then  after  a
short pause used skin as reference. The other
half  started with skin and then judged wood.
Within each block, the order of the surface tiles
was randomized separately for each observer. 
Table 1: The four test conditions under which separate
groups of subjects were asked to explore the material sur-
faces.
The procedure consisted of three parts. First,
subjects had to estimate the friction of the ten ma-
terials, all  presented successively and in random
order. To do so, they had to adjust the slope of the
ramp (see Figure  17). After inspecting the refer-
ence surface and the first tile, they had to set the
ramp’s slope to the point where they expected the
particular  surface  to  just  start  slipping  on  the
ramp.  The  surface  tiles  were  never  physically
placed on the ramp. Then the remaining nine tiles
had to be judged in the same manner. 
In the second part, a short questionnaire was
given to the subjects. Finally, the procedure was
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Figure  17:  The ramp used to  measure  the estimated
friction  coefficients  produced  by  the  participants.  The
ramp had to be adjusted to the angle at which the re-
spective tile would just about start to slide. In the case of
skin as reference surface, observers were told to imagine
the ramp to be their torso or to be covered with skin.
Figure  18:  Actual and perceived coefficients of friction
between  skin and  the  respective  materials.  The  solid
black line corresponds to the actual angle of the slope at
which the tile would indeed start to slide. The other lines
represent subjective judgments averaged across all parti-
cipants  of  each  group  respectively.  Error  bars  indicate
standard errors of the mean.
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repeated with the other reference surface. The or-
der of which reference surface was chosen first was
counterbalanced such that half the observers star-
ted with wood and the other half started with skin.
2.3.4 Results
Line graphs show the actual and the averaged
estimated coefficients of static friction on skin
(Figure 18) and on wood (Figure 19). With the
exception of  Teflon  on  skin,  friction  was per-
ceived,  albeit  underestimated.  In  some  cases,
roughness  appears  to  have  guided perception.
For instance, the different grades of sand paper
produce similar friction because roughness and
contact area trade off against one another. The
coarse paper is rougher but at the same time
provides fewer contact points than the fine pa-
per. The resultant friction is in fact comparable.
However,  the  coarse  paper  was  mistakenly
thought to produce more friction than the fine
paper. 
With skin as reference surface, haptic ex-
ploration  improved performance  but  estimates
remained far from perfect. Teflon in particular
was  grossly  mis-estimated.  The overall  results
showed  significant  main  effects  of  Material
(F(5.7, 342.4)=22.85,  p<.001, partial ² =.27)η
and  Reference  Surface  (F(1.0,  60.0)=17.80,
p<.001, partial ² =.23). In addition, the effectsη
of Condition were more pronounced for the ref-
erence surface of skin; the interactions of Mater-
ial  x  Condition  (F(17.1,  342.4)=2.92,  p<.001,
partial ² =.13) and between Material x Surfaceη
(F(7.9, 475.2)=2.87,  p=.004, partial ² =.046)η
were significant. The interaction of Material x
Surface x Condition was also significant (F(23.8,
475.2)=1.69,  p=.023,  partial  ²  =.078).  Conη -
trasts revealed that performance was poorer in
the  photo  condition  compared  to  the  haptic
condition (p=.023) and the haptic-visual condi-
tion (p=.007). The latter two did not differ sig-
nificantly  from  one  another  or  from  vision
alone.
The  post-experimental  questionnaire  re-
vealed that most participants attempted to use
all available information and that they tried to
find out  which material  they were  confronted
with. After identifying the material, they estim-
ated the friction on the basis of  their  experi-
ence.  Perhaps  some erroneous estimates could
be  ascribed  to such cognitive  influences  upon
friction estimation.
In sum, static friction between a number
of different materials and the reference surfaces
skin and wood were picked up, but only to a
limited degree. Vision alone does transport in-
formation about the relational property of fric-
tion. This  ability to see friction is attenuated
but  still  present  when  photographs  are  used.
Thus, high-resolution detail appears to be cru-
cial. Surprisingly, haptic cues were not superior
to  visual  cues  and  even  in  combination  only
tended to improve performance. Friction is gen-
erally underestimated, with the exception of Te-
flon and wood, which was grossly underestim-
ated.  Multisensory  information  did  not  help
compared to unisensory information. It appears
that multiple information sources  improve the
perception of simple properties such as rough-
ness (Lederman &  Abbott 1981;  Lederman et
al. 1986), but fail to contribute in more complex
cases of assessing friction. When visual informa-
tion was reduced, not surprisingly, this affected
friction judgments negatively. The photo condi-
tion produced notable judgment errors. It would
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Figure  19:  Actual and perceived coefficients of friction
between  wood and the respective materials.  The solid
black line corresponds to the actual angle of the slope at
which the tile would start to slide. The other lines repres-
ent subjective judgments averaged across all participants
of each group respectively. Error bars indicate standard
errors of the mean.
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be  interesting  to  find  out  if  this  degradation
could be compensated for by providing haptic
cues together with the photographs. Note, how-
ever, that the photographs were able to produce
estimates  that  correlated  with  actual  friction.
Thus, some information about roughness is pre-
served in the photo and can be accessed. The
relational  property  of  friction  appears  to  be
qualitatively different from and not reducible to
roughness.
2.3.5 Friction experiment with manipulated
visual appearance
The preceding experiment has shown that ob-
servers are able to gain some information about
friction by visually inspecting the two involved
surfaces together exhibiting this complex prop-
erty.  Given this  ability,  we should be able  to
isolate some of the relevant visual surface fea-
tures  upon  which  this  ability  is  based.  In  a
second friction experiment, we limited the refer-
ence  surface  to  wood,  and  manipulated  the
visual properties of a select number of surfaces,
namely  Teflon,  foam rubber,  and sand paper.
Among  the  changes  in  visual  properties  were
factors  that  should  influence  perceived  rough-
ness and thereby potentially also friction, such
as convolving the picture with a wave pattern,
or changing the contrast in the picture.
2.3.6 Method detail
55 volunteer subjects (23 men and 32 women)
participated in the study. They were recruited
at the campus of the Johannes-Gutenberg Uni-
versity of Mainz and at a nearby supermarket.
All participants were naive with respect to the
purposes of the experiment. Their average age
was 31.8 years (SD = 12.6 and a range from age
16 to 59).
We took some of the pictures of the tiles
used previously. The pictures were taken on a
Fuji Finepix S5500 digital camera (four mega-
pixels) with a resolution of 1420 x 950 pixels.
One reference picture each of coarse sandpaper,
structured  foam  rubber,  and  Teflon  were
chosen. Then these reference pictures were mod-
ified  using  four  special  effects  provided  by
Adobe Photoshop Six. Five visual effect condi-
tions (Filter) were thus created for each of the
three materials (see Figure  20 for the case of
sand paper):
Figure 20: The reference picture (n) of the sand paper
tile, and the four filter effects applied to the reference pic-
ture: ocean effect (o), wave effect (w), reduced lightness
(d),  and  enhanced  contrast  (c).  Note  that  all  pictures
were of equal size in the experiment.
1. Normal:  The reference picture was the ori-
ginal photo of the surface without any special
effect.
2. Ocean:  The  original  photo  was  convolved
with  the  structure  of  an  ocean  surface.  A
photograph  showing  the  ocean  from  above
with its waves was put as a new layer upon
the  original  photograph  with  an  opacity
value of 25%. It added a look reminiscent of
structured wood to the photograph. We hy-
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pothesized  that  the  added  structure  would
increase perceived friction.
3. Wave: This filter introduced a wave pattern
into  the  picture.  This  distortion  effect  was
used with the parameters Number of Gener-
ators  (5),  Wavelength  (Minimum  10  Max-
imum 120),  Amplitude  (Minimum 5,  Max-
imum 35),  Scale  (horizontal  100%,  vertical
100%), Repeat Edge Pixels (On), and Type
(Sine). This filter distorts the original struc-
ture in the pattern of sine waves. We hypo-
thesized that here, the added structure would
not change perceived friction because waves
are  regular  and  smooth  compared  to  the
ocean texture.
4. Dark:  The lightness  of  the  surface  was  re-
duced uniformly by 50% (parameter setting:
50). We hypothesized that this would reduce
detail,  which would decrease perceived fric-
tion.
5. Contrast:  The  contrast  was  uniformly  en-
hanced  such  that  the  according  parameter
was raised to +50. We hypothesized that the
added  contrast  would  emphasize  roughness
and thereby increase perceived friction.
The photos were printed on high-quality photo
paper and shown to the volunteers  in  succes-
sion. The “normal” reference version of one ma-
terial was always shown first, and then four dif-
ferent  versions  of  the  same  material  were
presented  in  changing  pseudo-random  orders,
for each material  respectively. All  possible se-
quences of the materials were presented to dif-
ferent  observers.  They  were  asked to  imagine
the surface shown on the photograph as being
the surface of the ramp itself. The same ramp
as before was used (see Figure 17), but subjects
were  not  allowed  to  touch  its  actual  wooden
surface.  Then they were  asked to  decide  how
steep  the  ramp  would  have  to  be  set  for  a
wooden tile to start sliding down on the shown
surface. The tile of wood was shown to them
beforehand  and  they  were  asked  to  touch  it.
Then they had to put the ramp at the angle at
which they thought the wooden tile would just
start  to  slide.  As  before,  we  measured  the
height of the ramp setting in centimetres. With
this information, we calculated the angle with
sin( ) = height / ramp length = height / 44cmα
and finally the resulting estimated friction coef-
ficient for all surfaces.
2.3.7 Results
Figure  21 shows the  estimated  friction  coeffi-
cients for all three materials averaged across all
filters and across  the respective reference sur-
face.  Friction between wood and foam rubber
was judged to be highest, friction with sandpa-
per was judged intermediate, and friction with
Teflon was judged to be smallest. Figure 22 de-
picts the overall  averages by Filter (visual ef-
fect). Figure  23 shows the interaction between
Material and Filter.
A repeated measurement analysis of vari-
ance with Material and Filter as within-subject
factors  and  gender  as  between-subjects  factor
was  conducted  on  the  judged  friction  coeffi-
cients; F-values were corrected by Huynh-Feldt
as necessary. Material had a significant effect on
estimated friction (F(2, 106)=9.54, p<.001, par-
tial ² =.15). Foam rubber and paper did notη
differ,  but both were judged to produce more
friction  than  Teflon  (p<.001  and  p<.003  re-
spectively).
Figure  21:  Estimated friction coefficients for the three
materials  independently  averaged  across  all  filters,  and
the actual coefficients for the three materials on wood.
Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
The factor Filter also had a significant in-
fluence  on  the  estimation  of  friction  (F(4,
212)=5.351, p=.001, partial ² =.092). The unη -
filtered  stimuli  were  judged  to  produce  the
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smallest amount of friction, and all filters ap-
peared to increase the subjective coefficient of
friction. Figure 22 shows the estimated friction
for all five filters averaged across all three ma-
terials.  The  contrasts  between  the  estimated
friction  coefficient  values  for  “normal”  and
“ocean”  (p<.024),  “normal”  and  “dark”
(p<.001)  and  “normal”  and  “contrast”
(p<.023) were significant. Because of the some-
times  variable  judgments,  the individual  con-
trasts between “normal” and “wave” as well as
“contrast” and “dark” failed to reach signific-
ance. 
Figure 22: Estimated friction coefficients for the five fil-
ters averaged across the three materials. Error bars indic-
ate standard errors of the mean.
We  also  found  a  significant  interaction
between the factors  Material  and Filter  (F(8,
424)=3.99, p=.002, partial ² =.070). As visibleη
in Figure 23, this interaction was mainly due to
the immunity of Teflon to all filter manipula-
tions and to the special effect of the increased
contrast  on  foam rubber.  Now let  us  have  a
closer look at the three materials and how they
fared  with  the  different  filters.  Participants
could judge the friction between wood and the
shown surfaces rather well, with the exception
that the friction of sandpaper was underestim-
ated. For some reason some of the grittiness and
roughness  of  sandpaper  has  been  lost  in  the
photos, whereas no such loss occurred for foam
rubber  and  Teflon.  To  the  experimenter,  the
surface of sandpaper also did not look as rough
as it did in real life.
Teflon on wood was clearly judged to be
the most slippery surface. Interestingly, the es-
timated differences between the Teflon reference
and its  filter-treated  variants  were  very small
compared  to  the  other  materials  (see  Figure
23). Presumably, Teflon generally looks so slip-
pery that  a ceiling had been  approached and
the filters could not significantly change the low
friction ratings of Teflon. The surfaces that were
treated with “ocean” looked like rough wood;
the  manipulations  “contrast”  and  “dark”
seemed to make the structure clearer. The filter
“wave” had a smaller influence on the estima-
tions. Participants often said that they found it
difficult to classify the wave-treated surface. 
Figure 23: Interaction between the two factors Material
and  Filter.  Error  bars  indicate  standard  errors  of  the
mean.
The results of this experiment clearly show
that  irregular  additional  structure—as  intro-
duced into the surface by convolving the picture
with the ocean pattern—causes the perception
that the surface is less slippery. This was the
case  for  all  surfaces  that  were  not  extremely
slippery to  begin  with.  Other  than hypothes-
ized, reducing the lightness of the surface also
tended to produce higher ratings of friction. In-
creased contrast, on the other hand, produced
mixed  results.  Sandpaper  with  increased  con-
trast was judged to cause more friction. Con-
trast had a smaller but similar effect on Teflon.
However,  when  applied  to  foam  rubber,  in-
creased contrast had no effect. Taken together,
these effects demonstrate that visual aspects of
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a surface, such as its microstructure, its light-
ness, and its contrast co-determine how slippery
it is judged to be with respect to a given refer-
ence surface. Note, however, that the reference
surface was always wood, and simple roughness
judgments may have guided the friction estim-
ates.
To summarize the friction case study, we
conducted  two  experiments  to  assess  whether
observers are able to visually perceive the com-
plex relational property of friction between two
surfaces  even  when  not  allowed  to  touch  the
surfaces. They were able to do so with limita-
tions.  Observers  generally  tended  to  underes-
timate the degree of friction. An underestima-
tion of friction as observed in these two studies
could be regarded as a conservative approach to
judging the grip force required to successfully
grasp objects. Using more force than necessary
rarely  leads  to  disaster  (consider  raw  eggs),
whereas too little grip force causes an object to
slip out of our hand and fall.
The  first  friction  experiment  compared
judgments based upon visual inspection alone,
and then after visual and haptic inspection. Vis-
ion in and of itself  provides valuable informa-
tion; additional  haptic information added sur-
prisingly little. The second experiment explored
the particular visual properties that make sur-
faces look more or less slippery, but note that
the  reference  surface  always  remained  un-
changed. Subjects likely differentiated between
surfaces of different roughness insofar as rough-
ness  (simple  property)  and friction  (relational
property) were correlated. Errors were large in
particular  when the  relational  property  to  be
judged was variable. Perceiving Teflon as very
slippery (with respect to skin) when it is indeed
quite the opposite is a grave perceptual error,
but it is not very meaningful to call the error an
illusiond. A perceptual miscategorization of the
relational property of friction between surfaces
might be a more appropriate description.
3 Conclusion
I have attempted to argue that we need to re-
conceive the notion of what an illusion is. In the
context  of  the  traditional  line  drawings  used
over a hundred years ago to illustrate the short-
comings of vision, illusionsm have begun to mis-
guide our thinking about normal perception. Il-
lusionsm do not indicate the error-prone nature
of visual perception. On the contrary, they tend
to  be  small  compared  to  the  many  illusionsd
that go unnoticed on a regular basis. To illus-
trate that this is the case, I have used two ex-
amples from the domain of complex relational
properties. This choice was based on the convic-
tion that perception of everyday objects always
necessarily includes judgment (be it in terms of
Helmholtzian unconscious inference, or be it in
terms of private models that may or may not
become transparent to the perceiver). The no-
tion that illusionsm should be of interest because
they reveal the workings of how the visual sys-
tem derives percepts from simple sensations is
not useful. It is not useful because an illusionm
only becomes manifest by a comparison process
that is at least as fraught with cognition as is
the perception of everyday relational properties.
We have used the classical  stick in the water
and the equally classical Ebbinghaus illusion to
illustrate that illusionsm only become manifest if
a cognitive operation is performed (i.e., a per-
ception-inference-cycle when moving the stick or
comparing the circle to a reference circle known
to be of identical size).
It is also impossible to investigate illusions
as merely phenomenal problems. And it is ill-
conceived to limit the study of visual perception
to seemingly simple phenomena that end up re-
quiring cognition after all. Perceiving is to make
perceptual judgments, be they explicit (e.g., by
saying  which  of  two  objects  is  larger),  or  be
they altogether implicit, or merely amenable to
consciousness  by an act  of  attention (e.g.,  by
determining  hand-aperture  when  grasping  an
object). It is thus impossible to investigate illu-
sions as purely perceptual errors. Instead, illu-
sions always have a cognitive component in the
sense that they require an act of comparison or
inference. This holds for all  illusionsm,  even if
they may not be amenable to consciousness. To
take illusions as a discrepancy between what we
see and what there is, is doubly mistaken. First,
there is always a discrepancy (illusiond) between
a visual percept and the object in the world to
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which  it  refers,  namely  the  stimulus.  And
second, only in rare and simple cases do we no-
tice  this  discrepancy  (illusionm).  The  discrep-
ancy is owed to the underspecification problem
(UP), the qualitative information gap between
the  two-dimensional  retinal  image  and  the
richer three-dimensional percept. The UP puts
the perceptual system in a position from which
it  has  to  draw  additional  information  from
memory,  from  inference,  or  from  internalized
structures that have been acquired throughout
evolution. Such structures have been suggested
to  include  that  objects  are  three-dimensional,
that light comes from above, that gravity acts
along  the  main  body  axis  when  standing  or
walking,  or  that  the  brightest  patch  in  the
visual  field  is  usually  “white”.  Internalized
structures gain particular weight if the stimulus
is poor. This is the case when looking at simple
line  drawings and it  is  all  the more the case
when looking at relational properties. The qual-
ity of solutions to the UP differ greatly as the
function of the task demands, but not necessar-
ily as a function of the complexity of the stimu-
lus.  On  the  one  hand,  the  perceptual  system
achieves performance that seemingly approaches
perfection  where  precise  motor  action  is  re-
quired in personal space. On the other hand, in
more remote action or vista space (for a very
useful taxonomy of space see e.g., Grüsser 1983)
some blatant errors are made. Our perception
often  defies  the  most  basic  laws  of  physics.
More  often  than  not  do  these  errors  go  un-
noticed. To illustrate how crudely our percep-
tions  approximate  reality  even  in  personal
space, we have explored errors in balancing ob-
jects  and judging  the  slipperiness  of  surfaces.
When it  comes  to  these  relational  properties,
our perception falls far from the truth. It ap-
pears that the errors tend to be as large as they
can be without interfering with the perception–
action cycle required for adequate or acceptable
action. The evolutionary fine-tuning would min-
imize error until it is no longer relevant for sur-
vival. In this sense, normal perception (i.e., the
illusiond)  is  a  satisficing  solution. The  mag-
nitude of the perceptual errors many observers
make is in the league of errors associated with
probability  judgments  (see  e.g.,  Kahneman et
al. 1982) and syllogistic reasoning, as opposed
to the much smaller errors typically associated
with perceptual illusionsm. 
Our  perception,  just  like  our  cognition,
has developed to find solutions to problems that
suffice. When reaching for an object, perception
is accurate enough not to knock it over but to
grasp it  (most  of  the time).  When judging  a
surface,  it  is  accurate enough that we do not
slip  (most  of  the  time).  These  examples  are
noteworthy because they do not  relegate per-
ceptual error to remote vista space, where preci-
sion would not matter. Toppling over an object
or falling on a slippery slope concern us in per-
sonal space. 
In essence, the UP is solved with remark-
able  accuracy for  simple  properties  of  objects
within our domain of interaction. However, as
soon as the perceptual properties become more
complex and involve the relation between two or
more  objects,  the  perceptual  system  can  no
longer solve the UP with any degree sophistica-
tion  that  goes  beyond  the  level  of  medieval
physics. But rather than giving up and seeing
astounding illusions everywhere, the system de-
grades gracefully and builds theories that suffice
for the purpose at hand. Their deviation from
reality is not experienced. These perceptual the-
ories may be thought of as more or less univer-
sal tools for upholding a meaningful world (in
the sense of  Shepard 1994); however, it might
make more sense to think of them as universal
tools with a private touch that accommodates
individual  perception-action  requirements.  A
hockey player or a juggler will for instance have
developed private models, be they unconscious
or amenable to introspection, about friction or
balancing that are more sophisticated than the
layperson’s. Note that these models need not be
explicit, in the sense of a perceptual process, of
which the cognitive elements cannot be separ-
ated out. 
Such private adjustments and elaborations
when solving the UP need not be made in the
case  of  classical  geometric-optical  illusionsm.  I
hope the above examples and case studies have
shown that ilusionsd, such as the Luther illusion,
do not require detection, and illusionsm that be-
come manifest, such as the Ebbinghaus illusion,
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can be upheld because their limited magnitude
makes them irrelevant for action. 
This  raises  the  questions  why  illusionsm
arise at all. Illusionsm might arise as mere epi-
phenomena or as meaningful warning signs for
the system to signal that a perceptual fine-tun-
ing is needed. The epi-phenomenon interpreta-
tion would suggest that the juxtaposition of two
contradictory percepts is  a fluke and happens
per-chance every once in a while. Optical illu-
sionsm are merely collections of such flukes. The
warning-sign interpretation would see in them
the purpose of fine-tuning the perceptual sys-
tem. If the perceptual system subserves action,
it would ideally minimize error (illusionsd), and
one mechanism to do so would be the experi-
ence of illusionsm. It is unclear, however, why il-
lusions would have to become conscious for this
fine-tuning to work. Would the necessary re-dir-
ection of attention require the experience of an
illusionm? Be this as it may, the system does not
even notice error—let alone attempt such fine-
tuning—when it comes to perceiving relational
properties. Even an approximate veridical per-
ception of relational properties is out of reach of
the perceptual system. The system merely ar-
rives at the first solution that satisfies our ac-
tion needs. A flashy epi-phenomenon or a warn-
ing system, as indicated by manifest illusionsm,
is not useful here, as the discrepancy between
percept and reality is too large. 
Now, one might ask about cases where the
error is exceedingly large and a warning may in-
deed be in place. These cases are rare; but they
do,  however,  result  in  manifest  illusionm,  and
hence are compatible with the purpose of illu-
sionm that  we  suggest.  Take  for  instance  the
perception of pain in a phantom limb. Here the
sufferer does notice the illusionm. How can pain
be so vividly felt  in a limb that is  no longer
there? The warning function of this manifest il-
lusionm is obvious. For instance, learned reflexes
involving  the  absent  limb  need  to  be  extin-
guished and reprogrammed. A more interesting
case  is  the  infamous  rubber-hand  illusion
(Botvinick & Cohen 1998) or the full-body illu-
sion that can be created in most observers by
synchronizing  their  actions  and  perceptions
with those of an avatar seen in a VR (Virtual
Reality) presentation (see e.g.,  Blanke &  Met-
zinger 2009;  Blanke 2012;  Botvinick &  Cohen
1998;  Lenggenhager et al. 2007). Only in such
extreme cases does the error manifest itself in a
complex  relational  case.  We  feel  that  we  are
someone  or  somewhere  else  and  at  the  same
time feel that we are not. It seems to take such
extreme cases before we find a sizable illusiond+m
that deserves the name “illusion”. 
In most cases, we can adjust perceptions
once we notice that they are erroneous, be they
ball  trajectories  or balancing properties.  How-
ever, this adjustment process is painfully slow
and may have to draw on early stages of per-
ceptual and cognitive development. It does not
take center stage, and some theoreticians would
claim that the adjustment process converges on
a veridical understanding of the world (Gibson
1979 calls  this  “attunement”).  Others  claim
that many perceptions are useful precisely be-
cause  they  do  not  match or  converge  on  the
world (e.g., the multimodal user interface the-
ory  of  perception,  Hoffman 2010).  The  satis-
ficing nature of private perception may not re-
quire  a  perfect  solution  of  the  UP  in  many
cases, as long as the slips and falls remain lim-
ited to a tolerable number.
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